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The Stakes of Cliometrics in Ancient History 
Claude Diebolt  
Abstract: »Das Infragestellen von Kliometrie in der Alten Geschichte«. Ac-
cording to Finley, markets and economic motivations played little, if any, role 
in ancient economies. Status and civic ideology governed the allocation of 
scarce resources. Hence, the application of economic theory to the ancient 
economy was at best a futile exercise and at worst a source of grave misunder-
standings. Temin’s contributions lead to other conclusions and, as in the myth 
of Sisyphus, the boulder seems again to be at the bottom of the hill! My feeling 
is that the Gordian knot remains the same now as over the past decades: should 
cliometrics be used in the social sciences/humanities in general, and ancient 
history especially? 
Keywords: ancient history, cliometrics. 
 
“No theory – no history! Theory is the pre-requisite to any scientific 
writing of history.” (Werner Sombart, Economic History Review, 2 
(1), 1929, p. 3) 
1. Introduction 
Antiquity and the Mediterranean constitute the two frames – one chronological 
and the other geographical – within which a major part of civilisation and eco-
nomic life used to concentrate. However neither Antiquity nor the Mediterra-
nean represent rigidly set realities. Their content is shifting and it is by defini-
tion subject to change. Within the antique Mediterranean, there was a 
succession of civilisations from the 4th millennium BC to the 4th or 5th cen-
tury AD and the same applies to the economic systems. The history of the 
antique Mediterranean is the history of a progressive extension of economic 
life from its edges – Egypt and Mesopotamia – to the Mediterranean Sea as a 
whole. From these two countries, the centre of economic life moved to the 
eastern coast, to Phoenicia and from there to Greece, then Carthage to reach the 
western part with Rome. Egypt and Mesopotamia shared two major character-
istics. Both were mainly land economies which functioned under the supervi-
sion of massive and centralised states. Phoenician and Greek cities as well as 
Carthage were economies based on maritime trade for which the land was only 
some kind of point of departure. In its own way, Rome represented the inter-
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penetration of the economic forces of land and sea. Rome tried to unite the 
antique economy and although it failed, it provided new bases which were to 
become the direct origins of our modern economies. This latter point, i.e. the 
assertion of a market economy, remains paradoxically, together with the issue 
of the use of the cliometric approach, one, if not the subject of major controver-
sies. To read Annex 1 on Finley’s inheritance and Annex 2 on the state of the 
art presented by Morris and Manning is particularly enlightening in this con-
text. 
2. The Market Economy under Discussion 
The nature and functioning of the market in Antique societies are at the very 
heart of recurrent discussions (cf. in particular Bang, 2006, pp. 51-88). Actually 
the market seems ambivalent enough for historians to qualify it as either primi-
tive or modern according to a tacit or explicit model, the so-called market 
model which plays a central part in our contemporary societies. To this day, as 
evidenced by the presentation of Annequin (2008) which is developed below, 
the problem remains quite topical. What part did exchange and market capital 
play in pre-capitalist societies? Already in 1893 in Die Entstehung der 
Volkswirtschaft, Bücher explained his vision of a closed ancient economy 
which Meyer opposed as he claimed that the most recent period in Antiquity 
was essentially modern. We have here the two opposed points of view to be 
debated (cf. Finley, 1979). 
In 1909 in Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum, Weber (cf. 1924 reprint) listed the 
obstacles which, he thought, prevented the capitalist development of the an-
cient economy: the limits of commercial production, the intermittent character 
of the exchanges and of the availability of capital ownership, the instability of 
this capital in status societies, the role played by slavery to slow down the 
ability to take into account economic rationality, etc. Antiquity economy can 
first be characterised in terms of shortcomings in reference to capitalist econ-
omy. During Antiquity the citizen was a homo politicus and not a homo 
oeconomicus. 
If, for Weber, capitalism was the most accomplished, the most rational form 
of he economy and of institutions, for Polanyi (1944, 2nd Ed. 2001), it was 
only a transitory, but original system since it allocated a central role to the 
market. The interpretation raised a problem of which Polanyi was aware, 
namely the problem of the presence, in the Greek city, of a real market place 
where all goods could be freely exchanged between equal economic partners, 
where a currency was used for all purposes. On the other hand, Finley (1973) 
objected to the market, probably because he thought the market might disrupt a 
global interpretation. 
The basic problem which is raised here is the relationship between institu-
tions and economic systems in ancient societies. Is then a cliometric and more 
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specifically a Northian approach (cf. North, 1990, 1991), which allocates a 
fundamental role to formal and informal institutions, capable of overcoming 
the terms of this recurrent debate? It could be said that North offered an inter-
esting alternative as he proposed that the institutional frame and the resulting 
organisations played an essential part in explaining the economic performance 
of nations. More formally, institutions are the rules of the game:  
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, eco-
nomic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanc-
tions, taboos, customs, tradition and codes of conduct), and formal rules (con-
stitutions, laws, property rights) (North, 1991, p. 97). 
Already in the VII and VI centuries BC, the Greeks devised a new type of 
market that they passed on to the various world economies centered on the 
Mediterranean. Considered over a long historical period, this market experi-
enced evolutions, transformations which cannot be summarised in a few words. 
On the other hand, when focussing on the structural elements, the innovative 
aspects of this institution – which the Greeks were perfectly aware – but also 
on the context, the cumbersome procedures which affected its functioning, it is 
possible to characterise this market and to specify its role in the ancient econ-
omy on the basis of recent research results (cf. Manning & Morris, 2005). 
In urban Greece, civic society was based on ownership; it provided opportu-
nities to buy, to sell, to freely pass on one’s belongings and hence to have total 
control over them. As soon as archaism was over, the major cities minted their 
own money and had an all purpose money with a generally recognised value 
which meant that it could circulate widely. But more importantly, the city with 
its agora represented an integral whole which was the horizon of the Greek 
citizen. At the heart of the city, the agora occupied a space delimited by bound-
ary stones where the exchange time was precisely specified. City magistrates 
supervised the lawfulness of transactions, the value of contracts, the quality and 
quantity of products exchanged the definition of fair prices. On the agora, the 
buyer could measure, compare, check and if necessary sue against a fraudulent 
sale. The same applied to all agorai and all places where things were ex-
changed, e.g. a harbour which was also a space delimited by boundary stones, 
supervised by magistrates, a space beyond which trade was illegal. Within 
these exchange spaces, the city was to guarantee, as best as possible, security, 
lawfulness, transparency of transactions and information of economically equal 
partners: no need to stress how essential this last point was. 
Hence one could say that this market was not a natural result of the devel-
opment of exchanges, neither was it inherited, but it was really an original 
institution which was progressively completed with complex jurisdictions on 
business law, supervision of maritime loans, etc. It is obvious that this market 
considered as an institution considerably boosted exchanges by limiting their 
uncertainty, reducing the impact of asymmetric information between the seller 
and the buyer, by allowing merchants and ship owners to get organised so as to 
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take into account in their operations economic circumstances and to make the 
best possible use of their rationality drawn from experience. However this 
market – more than most others – remained imperfect, subject to climatic haz-
ards, slow transports, political uncertainties, predatory behaviours. Moreover 
the market, especially the market for slaves, was supplied by war and piracy as 
well as by purchase, sudden supply variations, local variations which frag-
mented supply, limitations imposed on the circulation of specific goods, the 
interventionist policies of some public authorities, in particular to guarantee 
supply. 
Consequently it seems obvious that it is necessary to take into account the 
economic dimension of political behaviours, the relationship between these 
behaviours and the free play of the market, to check whether it is possible to 
approach the economic and the political areas as two distinct categories. Such 
questions remind us of the content of the old quarrel between primitivists (who 
considered that before our time no economy had been governed by the market) 
and modernists. 
Today the economic historian can call on new tools: information resulting 
from archaeology which relies on efficient prospective, analytical and statisti-
cal means; advances in areas of historical demography which remained for a 
long time too unreliable; the development of trans-cultural comparisons as well 
as the use of new concepts born partly from economic theory. It seems today 
that it might be possible to overcome the head-on opposition between a liberal 
and modern approach as personified by Rostovtzeff (1930, 1957) and the ap-
proach of the substantivists who are heirs to Polanyi (1944, 2nd ed., 2001), 
which might have led partly to some kind of epistemological dead-end. 
New approaches to ancient economies and the place allocated to the market 
have been proposed. I will mention two examples which seem to me on the one 
hand to be good illustrations of the trends of present day research and which on 
the other hand deserve further detailed work. 
The first example can be seen from a perspective which focuses on pre-
industrial economies and the role played by the market as well as from a com-
parative approach which offers some kind of model to interpret the market. 
For instance Bang (2006) studied the system of the bazaar which, according 
to him functioned in various pre-industrial societies which had enlarged mar-
kets, such as the Roman and Greek worlds, the Islamic world, India or Imperial 
China. He considers the bazaar as some kind of model, as an ideal type in We-
ber’s sense of the term and he considers that this system is best suited to an 
instable, uncertain and fragmented market. Actually it favours associations of 
merchants and financiers which curb risks; it provides the necessary flexibility 
to face local variations; it ensures a good information on the spot and hence 
makes it possible to develop opportunistic behaviours. In a given context, the 
bazaar provides efficient answers which remain however limited but at the 
same time it contributes also to perpetuating some structural problems of the 
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market. It is interesting to note that although this approach is one which 
strongly singles out the market in pre-industrial societies, it stresses at the same 
time the influence of current studies as it favours the analysis of exchange 
strategies, of profitability calculations, of the search for information to reduce 
uncertainty, of the functioning of networks which may decrease risks. 
Along the same line, Temin showed in 2001 that the economy of the early 
Roman Empire was primarily a market economy. Market exchange was ubiqui-
tous, and market prices moved together in ways typical of markets, albeit im-
perfectly coordinated ones. Moreover, in 2004, he advocated the idea that the 
supply and demand of labour were equilibrated by wages and other payments 
to workers, albeit in a rough way. Before that, in 2002, his analysis of the long-
est continuous price data from the ancient world, which came from ancient 
Babylon, showed that they were market prices. 
The second example aims at going beyond the issue raised by the supporters 
of a socio-economics derived from Polanyi’s analyses. Some specialists of 
ancient economies, who find the work of the new economy or institutional 
history attractive (North, 1990; 1991), qualify, criticise, or even reject globally 
the analyses which follow Polanyi’s work. The followers of the neo-insti-
tutional theory, who oppose this largely accepted interpretation, note that in all 
societies, the task of institutions is to reduce the uncertainty of exchange, that 
in all societies economic constraints and institutions determine the production 
and transaction costs and hence the feasibility and profitability of economic 
action (cf. Coase, 1960). Far from being split into independent structures, eco-
nomic logic and institutional logic have been closely linked throughout history. 
And we should concentrate on this double logic: 
If the proper choice of a model depends on the institutional context – and it 
should – then economic history performs the nice function of widening the 
range of observation available to the theorist. Economic theory can only gain 
from being taught something about the range of possibilities in human socie-
ties. Few things should be more interesting to a civilized economic theorist 
than the opportunity to observe the interplay between social institutions and 
economic behaviour over time and place (Solow, 1985, p. 329). 
Hence Greek and Roman societies, which had developed an enlarged but non 
capitalistic market capable of developing widely the scope of exchange, would 
– with their specific characteristics – fall within the same analytical approach 
as contemporary societies. 
Even if we try not to cast a suspicious (critical) look at the above-mentioned 
examples and the corresponding various attempts at modelling and conceptual-
ising, we still have to check the validity of the new interpretations, to question 
the relevance of the use of some tools, some categories of economic analysis in 
our contemporary societies to understand ancient societies, and finally to assess 
the operational value of some more or less recent concepts imported from eco-
nomic theory. We still have to measure the weight of behaviours and ideolo-
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gies, to question the very notion of institution and the range of its social cover-
age. Would that help overcome some old issues which still seem actual, go 
beyond this widely felt epistemological lock-in on methodological progress and 
theoretical blockage? It is of course difficult to speak the final word on that 
point, but it seems worth trying. 
3. Conclusion 
Finley (1973) unveiled a view of the economic underpinnings of ancient 
economies in which markets and economic motivations played little if any role. 
Status and civic ideology governed the allocation of scarce resources.  
Hence, the application of economic theory to the ancient economy was at 
best a futile exercise and at worst a source of grave misunderstandings. 
Temin’s seminal and continued contributions to the field lead to the opposite 
conclusion and, as in the myth of Sisyphus, the boulder seems again to be at the 
bottom of the hill!  
My feeling is that the Gordian knot remains the same now as over the past 
decades: should cliometrics be used in the social sciences/humanities in gen-
eral, and ancient history especially? Is it a discipline which could harmoniously 
marry theory and empirical analysis? Is it in the first place a branch of history 
or of economics? How much credibility should be lent to this research ap-
proach? Which kind of cliometric methods should be used? Will social sci-
ences/humanities and ancient history thus become more scientific? Which role 
should and can cliometrics play in the training of young students and doctoral 
students engaged in academic research in these disciplines? And finally what 
should be done to overcome the – real even if often latent – communication 
barrier generated by the introduction of systematically quantitative methods in 
the literature in social sciences/humanities and ancient history, at a time when 
these disciplines are becoming technically more elaborate, an evolution which 
is most probably not reversible?  
My teaching aims at contributing some partial answers, even if I find it sur-
prising that there should still be lively discussions about the questions I raised 
above: actually quantification has almost always been part of historical work in 
the social sciences, the humanities and ancient history. In fact the question is 
whether we really have the choice between using quantitative methods or not? I 
consider that we do not and for one essential reason, namely that the quantita-
tive element is to be found in all approaches but probably implicitly rather than 
explicitly. Quantitative methods have always been the intrinsic characteristic of 
research in the social sciences and the humanities, but except in economics, 
their use has been mostly secret and subliminal. As many issues which rely on 
quantitative dimensions are covered up by words, quantification is not appar-
ent. I usually illustrate this proposition by challenging my students to choose 
one page at random in one of their favourite books in economics, history, law, 
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sociology or others and I ask them to decide whether quantification is implic-
itly to be found in what they have just read. It is actually often the case. My 
answer to the first question would therefore be that it is a waste of time to argue 
about whether it is necessary to promote quantification in the social sci-
ences/humanities and ancient history, also because it is obviously neither pos-
sible nor necessary to exorcise this so-called devil!  
In the end the real question is another one, namely how to make a better use 
of quantification (cf. Costa, Demeulemeester & Diebolt, 2007)? From my point 
of view, unless it goes along with a statistical and/or econometric treatment and 
a systematic quantitative analysis, measurement is nothing but another form of 
narrative history. It uses figures instead of words, but it does not rely on any 
other factor. On the other hand cliometrics innovates in the way it phrases its 
explanations of past economic development in terms of valid hypothetical-
deductive (economic) models which call on the finest econometric techniques. 
The aim is to identify the interaction between variables in a given situation 
using a mathematical expression. If the question is asked in this way it becomes 
obvious that positions which are too rigid are not possible but that the corre-
sponding research is also much rarer! 
Following this argument, it is also essential, before attempting any model-
ling exercise, that each cliometric research should turn first to an explicit eco-
nomic historical analysis. This kind of analysis enables to pinpoint recurrent 
stylized facts and to identify the main actors. The objective is to identify the 
endogenous (behaviour of actors operating within the institutional framework) 
and exogenous (policy change, even if it can also be the product of endogenous 
move by specific actors) sources of institutional change (cf. Acemoglu, John-
son & Robinson, 2001; 2005). It would also provide some hint as to how far 
specific institutional arrangements might help promote the adaptiveness of the 
system as a whole: “Institutions are subtle forms whose real functioning cannot 
be discerned without a deep knowledge of their context and history.” (Clark, 
2007, p. 726). In fact,  
beyond the study of long run quantitative data sets, a branch of cliometrics is 
more and more focused on the role and evolution of institutions by aiming at 
combining both the desire for generality of the economists and the concern for 
the precise context in which economic players act that characterise both the 
historians and other social scientists. The middle road between pure empiri-
cism and disincarnate theory might perhaps open the door to a better eco-
nomic theory, enabling economists to understand more deeply the working of 
economies and societies and by the way offer better policy advice (Demeule-
meester & Diebolt, 2007, p. 16.). 
As Kindleberger (1990) once pointed out, economic history is certainly not 
sufficient to ensure good economic analysis, but it is however a necessary 
condition. It can help identify which assumptions and which models are likely 
to best represent the reality at hand. Greif (1993, 1998, 2006) indeed showed 
that very often, game theoretical models are too general and provide multiple 
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equilibria. Only a precise economic and institutional historical analysis can 
help disentangle all these elements. 
In the new institutional history a point is common with the traditional prac-
tise of the (positivist) historian: the historical analysis had to be as “precise” as 
possible (accounting as precisely and truthfully as possible for the precise 
sequence of events, i.e. wie es eigentlich gewesen ist). However here the his-
torical work is just a preliminary step before trying to locate some recurrent 
phenomena or stylized facts (or evolutions). 
North (1990) stressed that there are forms of persistency in human institu-
tions: their future evolution is partly conditioned by their history (i.e. path 
dependence, David, 2007). In a Northian perspective, institutions are the rules 
of the game established in order to reduce transaction costs in human interac-
tion by reducing uncertainty and establishing some common knowledge ways 
of interacting. The problem is that, once they are established, these rules are 
used by the various groups in society to promote their own interests. Thus they 
are reinforced, and they cannot be changed abruptly. The rules of the game 
have often been designed in a very static perspective, i.e. reducing uncertainty 
and consequently transaction costs in the short-run. They often reflect the bar-
gaining power of the various groups in society at a precise moment in time. 
They do not include any concern for dynamic efficiency. It might be, however, 
that certain institutional structures appear to favour entrepreneurship and 
wealth-creating activities. But it might also be true that they promote rent-
seeking activities. Countries could be trapped in a high-growth or a low-growth 
equilibrium due to their institutional framework (and the set of incentives they 
imply). This is the reason why institutional design is so important. Historical 
analyses can be a good tool in order to understand the way real-world institu-
tions since the ancient economies have evolved in a specific context. 
Appendix 1: Finley’s Heritage 
The core thesis of Finley’s Ancient Economy is clearly non-cliometric. 
[…] The model had to be qualitative not quantitative, because the ancients 
kept not usable statistics; but that fact in itself is significant. Their failure to 
collect systematic numerical data is not just an empirical problem for us, or 
evidence of their intellectual shortcomings, but a sign that the ancients did not 
see economic activity as a distinct element of life. In short, the ancient econ-
omy was embedded. The analytical heart of Finley’s model is status (Morris, 
Foreword, in: Finley, 1999, pp. XIX-XX). 
Ancient social and economic history is abode all rural history, the history of 
peasants, although in two vital cases – beginning in Greece around 600 B.C. 
and Italy around 200 B.C. and ending in both after A.D. 200 – the creation of 
“true” slave economies made free citizenries possible. This was a world in 
which family came first and nearly everyone aimed for economic self-
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sufficiency. Trade generally took place on a small scale and was conducted 
over short distances. Most fortunes were made from rents and control of the 
machinery of taxation. Only rarely did traders of industrialists make good, and 
when they did, they were eager to invest their gains in land. There were eco-
nomic changes – in particular, the steady concentration of land in fewer and 
fewer hands in the Roman empire, and with in the blurring of the boundary 
between free and slave – but there was little economic growth to speak of. 
There were, of course, exceptions, such as the super-cities like Rome, Alexan-
dria, and Antioch, or, in a smaller way, classical Athens. These cities needed 
permanent grain imports to feed their citizens and housed substantial nonagri-
cultural groups. But they remained exceptions: even in the high Roman em-
pire, the truly urban population was never more than one-twentieth of the ru-
ral. It would be a mistake to call Graeco-Roman civilization urban, although 
its ruling classes certainly were. They showed little interest in the countryside 
so long as they could get enough food from it, and there was rarely (if ever) 
anything we could call state economy policy. […] As Weber had foreseen, the 
ancient economy, unlike the medieval, did not contain the seeds from which 
homo oeconomicus could grow […]: there were no forces acting to disembed 
the economy, to allow class and the market to override status. Finley’s ancient 
economy was a functioning coherent system, which came to an end not be-
cause of its internal contradictions but because of the interaction between Ro-
man social structures and the exogenous factors of increasing pressure on the 
frontiers: “There, if one wishes, is an economic explanation of the end of the 
ancient world” (Finley, p. 176) (Morris, Foreword, in: Finley, 1999, pp. XXI-
XXII).  
[…] I am suggesting not that the ancients were like Molière’s M. Jourdain, 
who spoke prose without knowing it, but that they in fact lacked the concep-
tual elements which together constitute what we call “the economy”. Of 
course they farmed, traded, manufactured, mined, taxed, coined, deposited and 
loaned money, made profits or failed in their enterprises. […] What they did 
not do, however, was to combine these particular activities conceptually into a 
unit. […] It then becomes essential to ask whether this is merely accidental, 
and intellectual failing, a problem in the history of ideas in the narrow sense, 
or whether it is the consequence of the structure of ancient society (Finley, 
1999, p. 21). 
The economic language and concepts we are all familiar with, even the lay-
men among us, the “principles”, whether they are Alfred Marshall’s or Paul 
Samuelson’s, the models we employ, tend to draw us into a false account. For 
example, wage rates and interest rates in the Greek and Roman worlds were 
both fairly stable locally over long periods (allowing sudden fluctuations in 
moments of intense political conflict or military conquest), so that to speak of 
a “labour market” or a “money market” is immediately to falsify the situation. 
For the same reason, no modern investment model is applicable to the prefer-
ences of the men who dominated ancient society (Finley, 1999, p. 23). 
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Appendix 2: Morris and Manning’s State of the Art 
A century of important work has created a large (but problematic) database, 
honed powerful (but somewhat narrow) methods, and identified fundamental 
(but unresolved) problems. Ancient historians should be proud of these 
achievements. But the field remains radically undertheorized and methodol-
ogically impoverished. Theory, method, and data are inseparable. Archaeolo-
gists and historians have made great advances in classifying and analyzing the 
primary sources but have not made thought enough about how to build models 
or how to relate models to the empirical facts. […] The result is economic his-
tory without economics. […] We see six ways to resolve these problems: 1. 
Conduct more discussion of the metanarratives that structure arguments. […] 
2. A deliberate turn toward social science history. […] 3. A broader approach 
to economic history. […] More thoughtful integration of archaeology into an-
cient history. […] More emphasis on ancient demography and technology. 
[…] Mode detailed comparisons of economic institutions through time and 
space (Morris & Manning, 2005, pp. 2-4). 
Ancient historians have largely ignored economic theory. There are two obvi-
ous reasons for this. First, ancient historians seem to feel that they lack the 
data to test formal economic models. But this is only a partial explanation, 
given economists’ propensity for “proofs” based on stylized facts or internal 
logic. Second, ancient historians seem to feel that economic models are no 
help for understanding a world of thin and discontinuous markets. This, in es-
sence, was Finley’s argument: The economic language and concepts we are all 
familiar with, even the laymen among us, the ‘Principles’, whether they are 
Alfred Marshall’s or Paul Samuelson’s, the models we employ, tend to draw 
us into a false account… to speak of a ‘labour market’, or a ‘money market’ is 
immediately to falsify the situation. For the same reason, no modern invest-
ment model is applicable to the preferences of the men who dominated ancient 
society. (Finley 1985a: 23). Finley probably exaggerated the weakness of fac-
tor markets in the Roman Empire (Temin, 2001). He was clearly right to insist 
that markets were less integrated than those in the twentieth-century West, and 
those historians who write as if ancient economies worked just like modern 
ones can go seriously astray (for example, French 1964). But that is far from 
being the end of the story. Development economists have shown that formal 
models can make sense of economies in which markets are shallow and frag-
mented (see Ray 1998). Further, ancient historians who combine simple for-
mal models with awareness of the peculiarities of antiquity have raised and 
answered important questions […]. their work is widely praised, but not 
widely emulated. We might say that they are models to the field, but not mod-
els for the field. There are two reasons for this distinction. First is an ideologi-
cal/institutional problem. Most ancient historians are educated in humanistic 
university departments, studying under liberal humanists. Second, the oppor-
tunity costs are high for ancient historians to become economists and econo-
mists to become ancient historians (Morris & Manning, 2005, pp. 30-31). 
Neoclassical economics has never had much influence on ancient Mediterra-
nean studies. Marxism dominated the field in East European communist coun-
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tries until 1989 and had some impact in Western Europe from the 1920s on-
wards (though hardly any in the United States). A larger minority of Western 
ancient historians embraced Weberian sociology from the 1950s onward, and 
some turned toward new historicism in the 1990s. But both the classical and 
biblical fields have always been overwhelmingly branches of liberal human-
ism. We want to increase the diversity of approaches in ancient history by 
drawing more inspiration from the social sciences, and in particular from We-
ber’s foundations (Granovetter 1990; Swedberg 1991), and the “new institu-
tional economics” that has wedded key neoclassical principles to a concern for 
institutions, ideology, and demography (North 1981; 1990) (Morris & Man-
ning, 2005, pp. 33-34). 
As Manning emphasizes, ancient historians usually build models inductively, 
generalizing from a mass of texts or artefacts. Some of the major advances 
have come when historians reverse this process, beginning from general 
propositions and using them to establish the parameters of the possible […]. 
(Morris & Manning, 2005, p. 38). 
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